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Abstract
Many computer systems have a functional requirement to release information. Such requirements are an important part of
a system’s information security requirements. Current information-ﬂow control techniques are able to reason about permitted
information ﬂows, but not required information ﬂows.
In this paper, we introduce and explore the speciﬁcation and enforcement of required information release in a language-
based setting. We deﬁne semantic security conditions that express both what information a program is required to release, and
how an observer is able to learn this information. We also consider the relationship between permitted and required information
release, and deﬁne bounded release, which provides upper- and lower-bounds on the information a program releases. We show
that both required information release and bounded release can be enforced using a security-type system.
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1 Introduction
Information-ﬂow control holds the promise of strong, end-to-end, application-speciﬁc information security [38]. To date,
most research on information-ﬂow control has focused on what ﬂows are permitted or prohibited in a system. For example,
noninterference [19] prohibits conﬁdential inputs ﬂowing to public outputs.
Many computer systems release (or declassify) conﬁdential information as part of their intended functionality, and as such,
violate noninterference. Much work in recent years has considered weakening noninterference to permit some ﬂow of conﬁ-
dential inputs to public outputs (e.g., [26, 12, 13, 40, 43, 42, 6]).
This article is an extended version of the paper “Required Information Release,” by Stephen Chong, which appears in the Proceedings of the 23rd IEEE
Computer Security Foundations Symposium, IEEE Computer Society, 2010.
1However, many systems have more than just permission to release information; they have an obligation to release infor-
mation. In this work, we introduce and explore the speciﬁcation and enforcement of required information release, or simply,
required release.
Examples abound of systems with an obligation to release information. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is a United States
federal law that was enacted after a series of corporate accounting scandals, and requires publicly held companies to report
details of their ﬁnances to a government agency. Thus, ﬁnancial systems of such companies are required to release sensitive
ﬁnancialinformationtothegovernmentagency. Pharmaceuticalcompaniesinmanycountriesarerequiredtoreportallresultsof
clinical trials of new drugs to a government agency (such as the Food and Drug Administration) to receive approval. Computer
systems that support the conduct of clinical trials must release all trial results, and not withhold negative results. In general,
transparency of organizations and processes requires the release of sensitive information. Other systems that are required to
release information include the following.
 Sealed bid auctions: at the end of the auction, the winning bid (and, depending on the auction, the winner’s identity) is
required to be released.
 Information purchase: once a customer has paid for information (such as electronic media), the information is required
to be available for download.
 Games: legal game-play often requires release of a player’s secret information, such as the cards in a player’s hand, or
the location of battleships on a player’s board.
 Course management system: when a professor indicates that exam results are available, the system is required to allow
students view their grades.
 Credit card sales: the receipt for a credit card purchase is required to show the ﬁnal four digits of the customer’s credit
card number.
In the examples above, the required release of information is an important aspect of each system’s information security. To
gain assurance in the systems’ correct implementation, it is necessary both to specify the required release (and other information
security requirements) and to verify that the implementation satisﬁes the speciﬁcation.
However, the speciﬁcation of required release is subtle. What does it mean for a program to satisfy the required release
of information? How do we know if a program is successfully and correctly releasing information? It does not sufﬁce for the
output of a program to simply depend upon, or be inﬂuenced by, the information required for release. Surprisingly, even if the
output contains the information required for release, the program may not satisfy the required release of information. We use
epistemic logic, and algorithmic knowledge [20] in particular, to guide our deﬁnition of required information release. Required
information release must specify not just what information is to be released, but also how that information is to be learned by
its intended recipient.
Required release is a functional requirement on a system: program output must allow an observer to learn certain informa-
tion. Noninterference and most other information ﬂow security conditions are not functional requirements. However, required
2release is an information ﬂow security condition; it describes a mandatory ﬂow of information to an observer. By contrast,
most existing work in information ﬂow considers permitted ﬂows of information. In terms of dependence, permitted informa-
tion ﬂow conditions restrict how the output is permitted to depend on the inputs. For example, noninterference requires that
public outputs do not depend on private inputs—if a private input changes, the public output should not change. Required
information release mandates that outputs must depend on inputs in a way that allows an observer to learn certain information.
Required release interacts with permitted information ﬂows in more interesting ways than other functional requirements: if
a system is required to release information, then the system must also be permitted to release it. Indeed, required information
release and permitted information release can be combined to specify both upper and lower bounds on the information that
a system releases. We do so by deﬁning bounded release, a security condition that combines required release and delimited
release [39], and thus speciﬁes both what information a program is required to release, and what information it is allowed to
release.
For some systems, bounds on information release should be tight. For example, a company producing reports in accordance
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act typically wishes to release no more information than is required by law; thus, the information that
their ﬁnancial system is permitted to release should be identical to the information it is required to release. In other systems,
the bounds are not tight, such as in a poker game where some players are permitted, but not required, to reveal their cards at the
end of a hand.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 uses the example of a simple credit card sales system
to examine what it means for a system to satisfy required information release. Section 3 presents an interactive imperative
language that we use in Section 4 to formally deﬁne required release. We also deﬁne bounded release, a security condition
that speciﬁes what information a program is required and permitted to release. We show in Section 5 that required release and
bounded release can be soundly enforced in an interactive language by a type system. Section 6 discusses related work, and
Section 7 concludes. Appendices A and B contain proofs of the key theorems.
2 What is required release?
Consider, as a running example, a (grossly simpliﬁed) credit card sales system that takes a credit card number as input from
high conﬁdentiality channel H, and is required to release the last four digits to low conﬁdentiality channel L (representing, for
example, the printer, or an audit log). What does it mean for this system to satisfy the required release of the last four digits?
Noninterference is a strong information security condition that requires that public outputs reveal no information about con-
ﬁdential inputs. Any system that releases conﬁdential information violates noninterference; the credit card sales system, which
must release the last four digits of the conﬁdential credit card number to a publicly observable printer, violates noninterference.
However, just because a system violates noninterference does not mean it satisﬁes the required information release.
Consider the following attempt to implement the credit card sales system.
3P1 : input cc from H;
if (cc mod 10;000) < 5;000 then
output 0 to L
else
output 1 to L
The program inputs the credit card number from channel H, and then outputs either 0 or 1 to channel L. The output observed on
channel L is inﬂuenced by the last four digits of the conﬁdential input, and thus the program does not satisfy noninterference.
However, the program fails to satisfy the required information release, as an observer of channel L does not learn the credit
card number’s last four digits.
Even if a system outputs the information required for release, it may fail to satisfy the required information release. This is
demonstrated in the following program, which is another attempt to implement the credit card sales system.
P2 : input cc from H;
i := 0;
while i < (cc mod 10;000) do
output i to L;
i := i + 1;
output (cc mod 10;000) to L;
i := i + 1;
while i < 10;000 do
output i to L;
i := i + 1
The command output (cc mod 10;000) to L in program P2 above explicitly outputs the credit card’s last four digits. However,
every execution of the program outputs all integers from 0 to 9,999 in order. An observer of channel L always sees the
same output, regardless of the credit card’s last four digits, and so the observer learns nothing. (Indeed, program P2 satisﬁes
noninterference: the observer cannot learn anything about the credit card number.)
These examples show that it is insufﬁcient for observable output to be merely correlated with the information required for
release, or even for the output to contain that information. The key insight is that to satisfy required release, the output must
allow an observer to know what information was required for release.
Inmodelsofknowledgebasedonpossibleworldsemantics[22,17], anagenthasimplicitknowledge(or, simply, knowledge)
of fact  if in all possible worlds consistent with the agent’s observations,  is satisﬁed. In the credit card system, an observer
of channel L knows the last four digits of the credit card if all credit cards that could have produced the observed output end in
the same four digits. Programs P1 and P2 do not allow an observer of channel L to know the last four digits.
Standard logical approaches to knowledge suffer from the problem of logical omniscience: an agent knows all logical
consequences of its knowledge. The following attempt to implement the credit card system demonstrates this problem. The
4program chooses two large primes, outputs their product, and the result of XOR-ing the smaller prime with the last four digits
of the credit card number (padded with random bits to be the same length as the prime).
P3 : input cc from H;
p := generateLargePrime();
q := generateLargePrime();
output p  q to L;
if p < q then t := p else t := q;
output t xor pad(cc mod 10;000) to L
A logically omniscient observer of the program’s output knows what the last four digits of the credit card number are. However,
determining this requires factoring a large number, which is beyond the abilities of humans and current computer systems to
perform in reasonable time.
Algorithmic knowledge [20] was introduced to address the problem of logical omniscience, and we can use algorithmic
knowledge to reason whether a system satisﬁes required release.
An agent has algorithmic knowledge, or explicit knowledge, of fact  if the agent has an algorithm that responds “Yes”
when given input  and the agent’s observations. The agent’s knowledge algorithm is sound if whenever it responds “Yes” then
the agent has implicit knowledge of , and whenever it responds “No” then the agent does not have implicit knowledge of .
The knowledge algorithm may also respond “?” when it cannot determine whether the agent does or does not have implicit
knowledge. A knowledge algorithm is complete if it always answers “Yes” or “No” and never answers “?”.
Rich classes of knowledge algorithms have been studied that can conservatively overestimate the computational ability of
agents without giving the agents logical omniscience (e.g., [37, 36]). However, we are interested in simple algorithms. Such
algorithms may be described in user manuals, speciﬁed by a government agency or auditor, or may be inferred from self-
explanatory output. In all cases, the aim is to make it easy for an observer to learn the released information. In this setting,
the observer is not the adversary, and it is acceptable (even desirable) to underestimate the observer’s computational abilities,
much as an instruction manual aims to be usable by as wide an audience as possible. For some programs (such as P3), there
may be sound knowledge algorithms that are beyond the ability of any observer to execute in reasonable time; such programs
do not allow the observer to easily learn the released information, and are thus of no interest to us. For required release, we are
concerned with the existence of sufﬁciently simple sound knowledge algorithms.
The following program does release the last four digits of the credit card number to channel L.
P4 : input cc from H;
output “Last 4 credit card digits: ” to L;
output (cc mod 10;000) to L
Moreover, there is a simple sound knowledge algorithm to provide explicit knowledge for an observer of channel L: given
fact   (ccmod10;000) = n, respond “Yes” if and only if the second output is n. Because there is a simple sound algorithm,
an observer can gain explicit (and implicit) knowledge of the last four credit card digits, and so the program satisﬁes the required
5information release.
To specify required release, we must specify not only what information is to be released, but also how that information is to
be learned. We formalize this intuition by deﬁning required information release in terms of a simple interactive programming
language.
3 Language
In this section we present a simple interactive imperative programming language due to O’Neill et al. [33]. We use an interactive
language as it is more general than the batch model traditionally used to reason about language-based information ﬂow, and
it can more accurately model real world programs that interact with their external environment, such as server processes, and
programs with user interfaces.
We assume set L of security levels, ordered by a reﬂexive transitive relation v that indicates the relative restrictiveness of
the levels. In this paper, our examples use the two element set L = fL;Hg where L v H. Security level L represents low
conﬁdentiality, and security level H represents high conﬁdentiality. More expressive security levels are possible (e.g., [31, 10]).
Metavariable ` ranges over security levels.
3.1 Users, channels, and strategies
Users interact with executing programs. We assume that security levels characterize users: the security level of a user indicates
the most restrictive level of information the user is permitted to read. We assume that users with the same security level can
freely collaborate, and so, without loss of generality, assume only a single user at each level.
Users communicate with executing programs via channels. We assume input on channels is blocking, and output is non-
blocking. We assume that there is a single channel for each user, which, given the assumption of a single user for each
security level, implies a single channel for each security level. We thus identify channels with security levels. An event is the
transmission of an input or output on a channel. Event in(`;v) denotes the input of value v on channel `, and event out(`;v)
denotes the output of value v on channel `. For simplicity we restrict values to integers.
We use Evin and Evout to denote, respectively, the set of all input and output events. We use Ev(`) to denote the set of all
events that could occur on channel `, and Ev to denote the set of all events.
Evin ,
S
`2L;v2Zfin(`;v)g
Evout ,
S
`2L;v2Zfout(`;v)g
Ev(`) ,
S
v2Zfin(`;v);out(`;v)g
Ev ,
S
`2L Ev(`)
Given E  Ev, an event trace on E is a ﬁnite or inﬁnite sequence t = h0;1;:::i such that i 2 E for all i such that
0  i < jtj, where jtj is the length of t. For inﬁnite traces t, we deﬁne jtj = 1. The ith element of event trace t is denoted
6t(i), for i such that 0  i < jtj. The empty trace is denoted hi. We write tˆt0 for the concatenation of ﬁnite trace t and trace t0.
For traces t and t0, we say that t extends t0, written t  t0, when t0 is a preﬁx of t. Note that if t is an inﬁnite trace, then t is the
only trace that extends it. The set of all traces on E is denoted Tr(E).
The restriction of trace t to E, written t  E, is the trace obtained by removing from t all events not contained in E. We
write t` as shorthand for tEv(`).
User strategies express the behavior of users by describing how users interact with a program. Given trace t, a user of a
channel with security level ` observes the event trace tEv(`); a user’s observations may inﬂuence their subsequent interaction
with the program. Formally, a user strategy for a channel with security level ` is a function of type Tr(Ev(`)) ! Z, and
expresses what input a user will provide given their previous observations.
Let UserStrat be the set of all user strategies. A joint strategy is a collection of user strategies, one for each channel.
Formally, a joint strategy ! is a function of type L ! UserStrat, that is, a function from security levels to user strategies.
User strategies are sensitive information. In general, we want to ensure that lower security users do not learn about strategies
employed by higher security users: user ` should not learn anything about the strategy of user `0, where `0 6v `. However,
information release will violate this, revealing some information about the strategies of higher security users. In Section 4 we
will discuss security requirements, and formally deﬁne semantic security conditions.
3.2 Syntax and semantics
We use a simple imperative language, extended with input, output, and declassiﬁcation commands. The syntax of this language
is:
(expressions) e ::= n j x j e0  e1
(commands) c ::= skip j x := e j c0;c1 j
if e then c0 else c1 j
while e do c j
input x from ` j
output e to ` j
x := declassify(e to `)
Metavariable x ranges over Var, the set of all program variables. Variables take integer values, and literal values n also range
over integers. Metavariable  ranges over total binary operations on the integers. A state  maps variables to values, and so
is a function of type Var ! Z. A conﬁguration is a 4-tuple (c;;t;!) representing a system about to execute c with state 
and joint strategy !. Finite trace t is the history of events produced by the system so far. Terminal conﬁgurations have the form
(skip;;t;!). Metavariable m ranges over conﬁgurations.
We deﬁne a small-step operational semantics for our language, using the relation  ! over conﬁgurations. If (c;;t;!)  !
(c0;0;t0;!) then execution of command c can take a single step to command c0, while updating the state from  to 0. Trace t0
extends t with any events that were produced during the step. Joint strategy ! is unchanged when a conﬁguration takes a step,
7and is included in conﬁgurations to simplify notation and presentation.
Fig. 1 presents inference rules for the operational semantics. We use (e) to denote the evaluation of expression e where
each variable x is replaced with the integer (x). Input command input x from ` takes the next input value v as deﬁned by
the user strategy for `, assigns it to variable x, and updates the trace with input event in(`;v). Similarly, output command
output e to ` evaluates e to v, and updates the trace with output event out(`;v). Declassiﬁcation x := declassify(e to `)
is semantically equivalent to assignment x := e; the declassify annotation and security level ` are used in the type system,
described in Section 5.
We use  ! to denote the reﬂexive transitive closure of  !. For ﬁnite trace t, we say conﬁguration m emits t, written
m   t, if there is some conﬁguration (c;;t;!) such that m  ! (c;;t;!). For inﬁnite trace t, m emits t if m emits all
ﬁnite preﬁxes of t. Note that emitted events may include both input and output events.
4 Security deﬁnitions
In this section we deﬁne the security conditions weak required release and strong required release, which formally express
what it means for a program to satisfy the required release of information. We also present the security conditions noninterfer-
ence (e.g., [19, 38, 2]) and delimited release [39]. Noninterference requires that a program does not release any conﬁdential
information. Delimited release weakens noninterference by specifying what conﬁdential information a program is allowed to
release. We combine delimited release and required release to deﬁne bounds on what a program is permitted and required to
release.
4.1 Required release
To formally deﬁne required release, we must be able to express what information is to be released, and how that information is
to be learned by an observer. We introduce input expressions and output expressions to express each of these respectively. Input
expressions are expressions over input values supplied on channels; output expressions are expressions over values output on a
single channel.
The syntax for input and output expressions is:
(input expressions) f ::= n j f0  f1 j in`[i]
(output expressions) g ::= n j g0  g1 j out[i]
Input expression in`[i] refers to the ith input event on channel `, for i 2 N. Input expressions may also contain integer
constants and binary operations. Input expressions are evaluated against a trace. The judgment t in f + v means that with
trace t, input expression f evaluates to value v. Evaluation rules for input expressions are given in Fig. 2. If t does not have an
ith input event on channel `, then in`[i] evaluates to ?, that is, t in in`[i] + ?. We assume that any binary operator  deﬁned
is total over Z? and strict, meaning that for all m;n 2 Z?, m  n is deﬁned, and if m or n is ?, then m  n = ?.
8Output expressions are also evaluated against a trace. The judgment t `
out g + v means that output expression g evaluates
to value v using trace t restricted to channel ` events. Output expression out[i] refers to the ith output event on channel `, for
i 2 N. Fig. 2 also presents the evaluation rules for output expressions. Similar to input expressions, if there is no ith output
event on channel `, then out[i] evaluates to ?.
Note that output expressions out[i] do not have a subscript indicating which channel ` the output occurs on. This is because
output expressions are intended to be evaluated by a single user `, using only the output events on that user’s channel.
Intuitively, user ` learns input expression f from command c using output expression g, if in every execution that g evaluates
to an integer value (using the output provided to `), then f evaluates to the same integer. Thus, input expression f indicates
what information the user is to learn, and output expression g indicates how the user learns it—g provides a sound knowledge
algorithm. This leads us to our ﬁrst deﬁnition of required release.
Command c satisﬁes weak required release of input expression f to user ` using output expression g if for any trace t that
can be emitted by executing c, if t provides enough output to ` to evaluate g, then f and g evaluate to the same value.
Deﬁnition 1 (Weak required release). Command c satisﬁes weak required release of input expression f to user ` using output
expression g exactly when:
For all conﬁgurations m = (c;;hi;!)
and for all traces t such that m   t,
if t `
out g + v and v 6= ? then t in f + v.
Program P4 satisﬁes weak required release of inH[0] mod 10;000 to L using out[1]: the second output to L is the last four
digits of the ﬁrst H input (the credit card number). By contrast, programs P1 and P2 do not satisfy weak required release of
inH[0] mod 10;000 to L for any output expression.
Weak required release is “weak” in that there is no requirement that command c provide sufﬁcient output to ` for g to
evaluate to an integer value. For example, the program skip satisﬁes weak required release of any input expression to L using
output expression out[0], since no output is ever given to L, and output expression out[0] never evaluates to an integer value.
We can strengthen weak required release to ensure that command c always eventually provides sufﬁcient output to ` for
g to evaluate to an integer value. Command c satisﬁes strong required release of input expression f to user ` using output
expression g if for any trace t that can be emitted by executing c, there is a trace t0 that extends t, can be emitted by executing
c, and provides sufﬁcient output to ` to evaluate g, and f and g evaluate to the same value.1
Deﬁnition 2 (Strong required release). Command c satisﬁes strong required release of input expression f to user ` using output
expression g exactly when:
For all conﬁgurations m = (c;;hi;!)
and for all traces t such that m   t,
there exists trace t0 such that t0  t, m   t0, and
t0 `
out g + v and t0 in f + v for some v 6= ?.
1Since the language is deterministic, this deﬁnition sufﬁces to ensure that enough output is always eventually produced; the deﬁnition would need to be
modiﬁed for non-deterministic and probabilistic languages.
9Provided that input expression f depends nontrivially on every subexpression of the form in`[i], strong required release is
implies weak required release: if command c satisﬁes strong required release of f to ` using g, then it satisﬁes weak required
release of f to ` using g.
More formally, we say that input expression f depends nontrivially on subexpression in`[i] if given any two traces t and t0
that are identical except for the value of the ith input event on channel `, and t in f + v and t0 in f + v0 for some v 6= ?
and v0 6= ?, then v 6= v0.
Fortheremainderofthearticle, werestrictourattentiontoinputexpressionsthatdependnontriviallyoneverysubexpression
of the form in`[i].
Theorem 1. If command c satisﬁes strong required release of input expression f to user ` using output expression g, and f
depends nontrivially on every subexpression of the form in`0[i], then it satisﬁes weak required release of input expression f to
user ` using output expression g.
A proof of Theorem 2 appears in Appendix A.
The following program satisﬁes weak required release, but not strong required release of inH[0] mod 10;000 to L using
out[1], because in some cases it will never produce sufﬁcient output to L. (For presentation purposes, we assume that constant
strings, such as “Last 4 credit card digits: ” can be converted to appropriate constant integer values, and output to channels.)
P5 : input cc from H;
output “Last 4 credit card digits: ” to L;
if cc mod 10 = 0 then (while 1 do skip) else skip;
output (cc mod 10;000) to L
Program P4 satisﬁes strong required release of inH[0] mod 10;000 to L using out[1], because it always produces appropriate
output to channel L.
Connection to explicit knowledge If a program satisﬁes (weak or strong) required release of input expression f to user `
using output expression g, then output expression g provides a sound knowledge algorithm for ` to learn the value of f. The
knowledge algorithm takes as input a formula  and the sequence of events that ` has observed. The knowledge algorithm is
straightforward:
If   f = n and t `
out g + n then respond “Yes”.
Otherwise, respond “?”.
Note that the algorithm never responds “No”, and if the algorithm responds “Yes”, then, because the program satisﬁes
required release of f to ` using g, t `
out g + n implies f = n. Thus, the knowledge algorithm is sound.
Strong and weak required release are both parameterized by output expression g. As discussed in Section 2, the output
expression g may be speciﬁed by the consumer of the output (such as an auditor or government agency), an instruction manual,
or may be described by the program’s output (as in Program P4, where the text “Last 4 credit card digits” is output just before
the last four credit card digits). In practice, there may be additional requirements on the form of the output function, such as a
10limit on the number of steps required to evaluate it (analogous to requiring that the instructions for a task be no more than two
pages).
Conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability, and properties Required information release is primarily concerned with the conﬁ-
dentiality of information: it is phrased in terms of what an observer must be able to learn about conﬁdential inputs to the system.
However, required information release is also related to the integrity and availability of information. Weak information release
is an integrity requirement: if the output expression evaluates to an integer value, it must equal the evaluation of the input ex-
pression. Strong information release contains an availability requirement: the output expression must eventually evaluate to an
integer value. Information security requirements are not always easily separable into conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability
requirements.
Weak and strong required release can be deﬁned as properties: predicates over single execution traces. Weak required
releaseisasafetyproperty, andstrongrequiredreleaseisneithersafetynorliveness[1]. RecentworkbyClarksonandSchneider
[14] expresses some information-ﬂow conditions as hyperproperties: predicates of sets of traces. They note that all information-
ﬂow conditions they considered were hyperproperties and not properties. Although weak and strong required release are
properties, they clearly constitute part of a system’s information ﬂow requirements, so some information-ﬂow conditions of
interest are properties. Indeed, in Section 4.3 below, we discuss the relationship between required release and delimited release,
an information ﬂow security condition for permitted information release that is a hyperproperty and not a property.
4.2 Noninterference
Noninterference is a well-known semantic security condition that requires that public observations reveal no secrets. While
there are many deﬁnitions of noninterference (e.g., [19, 38]), the most relevant for our purposes are termination- and progress-
insensitive deﬁnitions for interactive models (e.g., [33, 5, 4]). Applied to the interactive setting used here, noninterference
ensures that user ` does not gain any knowledge about the strategy employed by any user `0 such that `0 6v `. That is, the
strategy of any such user `0 does not interfere with the trace observed by user `.
More precisely, a program satisﬁes noninterference if, for all security levels `, and all conﬁgurations m and m0 that agree
on the user strategies of all users `0 such that `0 v `, the traces emitted by m and m0 are indistinguishable to user `. Two traces
t and t0 are indistinguishable to user `, written t ` t0 if t` extends t0`, or vice-versa.
Deﬁnition 3 (Noninterference). A command c satisﬁes noninterference exactly when for all levels ` 2 L:
For all m = (c;;hi;!) and m0 = (c;;hi;!0)
such that !(`0) = !0(`0) for all `0 v `,
and for all traces t;t0 such that m   t and m0   t0,
we have t ` t0.
This deﬁnition of noninterference generalizes that of O’Neill et al. [33] for arbitrary sets of security levels L, and weakens
it to be both termination insensitive and progress insensitive. The deﬁnition of trace indistinguishability used here is suitable
11given the observational model, which does not allow a user to directly distinguish a terminated program from a program in a
non-terminating loop (termination insensitivity), or from a program that may eventually produce additional output (progress
insensitivity).
Note that strong required release of f to ` violates noninterference if the input expression f contains an input expression
in`0[i] such that `0 6v ` (and the evaluation of f depends nontrivially on in`0[i]). For example, any program that satisﬁes strong
required release of inH[0] mod 10;000 to L (such as program P4) must violate noninterference, since H 6v L, and L learns
something about the strategy of H, to wit, the last four digits of the credit card number that H entered.
Weak required release of f to ` does not necessarily violate noninterference if the input expression f contains an input
expression in`0[i] such that `0 6v `. However, if a program satisﬁes both noninterference and weak required release for such an
input expression, then the program never produces sufﬁcient output to evaluate the output expression.
4.3 Delimited and bounded release
Noninterference is a very restrictive security condition. Many real-world programs must violate noninterference in order to
satisfy functional requirements that require or allow the release of information.
The security condition delimited release [39] weakens noninterference by specifying what information a program is permit-
ted to release.
An escape hatch is a pair (f;`) of input expression f, and security level `. Intuitively, given escape hatch (f;`), a program
is permitted to release information f to security level `.2 Thus, given escape hatches (f0;`0);:::;(fk;`k), user ` is permitted
to learn the evaluation of fi for any escape hatch (fi;`i) such that `i v `, in addition to the user strategies of any user `0 such
that `0 v `.
A program satisﬁes delimited release by escape hatches (f0;`0); :::; (fk;`k) if, for any security level ` and conﬁgurations
m and m0 that have the same user strategy for any user `0 such that `0 v `, if m and m0 respectively emit traces t and t0 that
agree on the evaluation of all escape hatches that may release information to level `, then the traces emitted by m and m0 are
indistinguishable to user `. Formally, we say that traces t and t0 agree up to ` on escape hatches (f0;`0);:::;(fk;`k) if for all
i 2 0::k such that `i v `, we have t in fi + vi and t0 in fi + vi for some vi 6= ?.
Deﬁnition 4 (Delimited release). Command c satisﬁes delimited release by escape hatches (f0;`0);:::;(fk;`k) exactly when
for all levels ` 2 L:
For all m = (c;;hi;!) and m0 = (c;;hi;!0)
such that !(`0) = !0(`0) for all `0 v `,
and for all traces t;t0 such that m   t and m0   t0,
if t and t0 agree up to ` on
escape hatches (f0;`0);:::;(fk;`k),
then t ` t0.
2Sabelfeld and Myers [39] specify escape hatches as declassiﬁcation expressions declassify(e to `), and expressions in escape hatches refer to initial values
of variables.
12Delimited release generalizes noninterference: if command c satisﬁes delimited release by an empty set of escape hatches,
then c satisﬁes noninterference.
Both delimited release and required release are concerned with information ﬂow, and with the knowledge an observer
acquires. Required release speciﬁes what information, at a minimum, a program must release. It speciﬁes what an observer
must be able to (explicitly) know, and can be viewed as specifying “lower bounds” on what information a program releases. By
contrast, delimited release speciﬁes what an observer is permitted to (implicitly) know, and can be seen as specifying “upper
bounds”, the maximum information a program is permitted to release. We can combine the security conditions of delimited
release and required release to obtain both upper and lower bounds on a program’s information release.
By analogy with escape hatches (which are openings in the roof of a building, and specify the upper bounds on information
release), we use escape chutes (passages through which objects move by means of gravity) to deﬁne the lower bounds of
information release. An escape chute is a tuple (f;`;g) of input expression f, security level `, and output expression g. We
deﬁne bounded release by combining delimited release by escape hatches, and required release by escape chutes.
Deﬁnition 5 (Bounded release). Command c satisﬁes weak (strong) bounded release by escape chutes
(f0;`0;g0);:::;(fk;`k;gk)
and escape hatches
(f0
0;`0
0);:::;(f0
n;`0
n)
exactly when
1. for all i 2 0::k, c satisﬁes weak (strong) required release of fi to `i using gi; and
2. c satisﬁes delimited release by escape hatches (f0
0;`0
0); :::; (f0
n;`0
n)
ProgramP4 satisﬁesstrongboundedreleasebyescapechute(inH[0]mod10;000;L;out[1])andescapehatch(inH[0]mod10;000;
L). Thus, bounded release tells us not only that P4 releases the input expression inH[0] mod 10;000, but also that this is the
only information released by P4.
Thefollowingprogramhasdifferentupperandlowerbounds. Itsatisﬁesstrongboundedreleasebyescapechute(inH[0]mod10;000;
L; out[1]) and escape hatches (inH[0] mod 10;000; L) and (inH[0] div 1015; L). It always releases the last four digits of the
credit card number (via output expression out[1]) and it may in addition release information about the ﬁrst digit of the (16 digit)
credit card number.
13P6 : input cc from H;
x := declassify(cc mod 10;000 to L);
output “Last 4 credit card digits: ” to L;
output x to L;
y := declassify(cc div 1015 to L);
if y = 4 then output “Visa” to L else skip
There is a consistency property between the escape hatches and escape chutes. Since escape chutes are the “lower bounds”
of information release, they must contain no more information than the escape hatches, the “upper bounds” of information
release. More precisely, if t and t0 are traces that can be produced by a command satisfying bounded release, and t and t0 agree
on all input and output events on all channels up to some level `, and agree on the value of all escape hatches that declassify
to ` or below, then for each escape chute at level ` or below, either t and t0 agree on the value of the escape chute, or t and t0
do not have sufﬁcient input events to evaluate the escape chute. We say that traces t and t0 agree on escape chute (fi;`i;gi) if
t in fi + vi and t0 in fi + vi for some vi 6= ?.
Property1(Consistency). Ifcommandcsatisﬁes(weakorstrong)boundedreleasebyescapechutes(f0;`0;g0);:::;(fk;`k;gk)
and escape hatches (f0
0;`0
0);:::;(f0
n;`0
n) then
for all ` 2 L, and for all conﬁgurations m = (c;;hi;!)
and m0 = (c;;hi;!0), and for all traces t;t0 such that
m   t and m0   t0,
if t and t0 agree up to ` on
escape hatches (f0
0;`0
0);:::;(f0
n;`0
n), and
for all `0 v ` we have t`0 = t0`0
then for all i 2 0::k such that `i v `,
either t in fi + ?, or t0 in fi + ?, or
t and t0 agree on escape chute (fi;`i;gi).
Proof. (Sketch) Given m = (c;;hi;!), m0 = (c;;hi;!0), ` and t and t0 such that t and t0 agree up to ` on escape hatches
(f0
0;`0
0);:::;(f0
n;`0
n), and t  `0 = t0  `0 for all `0 v `, then we can construct joint user strategies !0 and !0
0 such that
m0 = (c;;hi;!0), m0
0 = (c;;hi;!0
0), and m0   t and m0
0   t0, and !0(`0) = !0
0(`0) for all `0 v `.
For any escape chute (fi;`i;gi) such that `i v `, suppose t 
`i
out gi + vi and t0 
`i
out gi + v0
i for some vi;v0
i 6= ?. By
delimited release, t `i t0, and so, t and t0 agree on the values of all output expressions required to evaluate gi to an integer
value. Therefore, vi = v0
i. By bounded release, the evaluation of fi in t and t0 also equal vi, and so and t and t0 agree on escape
chute (fi;`i;gi). u t
145 Enforcement
In this section we show that weak bounded release can be soundly enforced with a security type system. Weak bounded release
is the conjunction of weak required release, and delimited release. Since weak required release is a safety property, clearly
other enforcement mechanisms could also be used to enforce it, including dynamic mechanisms such as execution monitors.
However, due to the similarity of escape chutes and escape hatches, a type system that enforces delimited release can easily be
adapted to enforce weak bounded release as well.
Our type system conservatively tracks both the security level of information as it ﬂows through a program, and what input
expressions have been output and declassiﬁed. This allows us to ensure that (i) conﬁdential information is never output to
non-conﬁdential channels; (ii) only appropriate escape hatches are declassiﬁed; and (iii) appropriate escape chutes are output
to the correct channel in the correct order.
For command c, type judgments have the form
pc; ;C;;E;H ` c .  0;C0;0;E0;H0
where entities to the left of the turnstile (`) indicate the context before the execution of c, and primed versions on the right hand
side of the judgment indicate how the contexts change as a result of the execution of c.
Security level typing context   maps variables to security levels, and indicates an upper bound on the information stored in
each variable. Program counter level pc is an upper bound on the information that may cause command c to be executed, and
is used to track implicit information ﬂows [15]. Typing context   and program counter level pc are standard in security type
systems. Our type system is ﬂow-sensitive, as it allows command c to modify  , and is based on the ﬂow-sensitive security
type system of Hunt and Sands [23].
The remaining entities in the context (C, , E, and H) are used to track what input expressions have been output and
declassiﬁed. Speciﬁcally, we conservatively track how many input and output events have been produced on each channel,
what input expression (if any) is stored in each variable, what input expressions (if any) have been output, and what input
expressions have been declassiﬁed.
 C : L ! Z?  Z? counts the input and output events that have occurred on each channel. If C(`) = (i;j), then
the program has received i input events from channel `, and produced j output events to channel `. If i = ?, then an
unknown number of input events have been received on channel `, and similarly, if j = ?, an unknown number of output
events have been produced.
  : Var ! InputExp? indicates what input expression is stored in each variable. For any variable x, if (x) = f then
the value stored in x is equivalent to input expression f. If (x) = ? then nothing is known about the value stored in x.
 E : L  Z ! InputExp? indicates which input expressions have been output to channels. If E(`;i) = f then the ith
value output on channel ` was equal to the evaluation of input expression f. If E(`;i) = ? then either the ith output to
15channel ` has not yet been produced, or nothing is known about the ith output to channel `.
 H : }(InputExp  L) is a set of escape hatches that may have been declassiﬁed.
Fig. 3 presents inference rules for the typing judgment. Given a function h, we write h[a 7! b] for the function that evaluates
to b on input a, and otherwise behaves like h. We use  (e) to denote an upper bound of all levels  (x) for variables x occurring
in e; if L is a join semi-lattice, then this is the join of all  (x) for x in e. We extend function  to a homomorphism on program
expressions, and write (e) for the result of applying the homomorphism to expression e.
In the typing rules, security level context   and program counter level pc do not interact with other parts of the context, and
by themselves form a standard ﬂow-sensitive information-ﬂow security-type system, similar to that of Hunt and Sands [23]. In
the following discussion of the typing rules, we focus on the type system’s novel aspects.
For assignment x := e, T-ASSIGN updates input expression context  for x to (e), which is either ? or an input
expression equal to e at this program point. The typing rule T-DECLASSIFY for declassiﬁcation x := declassify(e to `) is
similar to assignment, but escape hatch ((e);`) is added to declassiﬁcation effect H. Note that the rule implicitly requires
(e) 6= ? since H must contain escape hatches. Rule T-SEQ simply threads the context through a sequence of commands. A
skip command has no effect on the context, shown in rule T-SKIP.
Command input x from ` assigns the next input from channel ` to variable x. Rule T-IN updates input expression context
 using helper function recordInput(;x;C;`), which updates (x) either to ? if the number of input events on channel ` is
not known, or to input expression in`[i], where i is the number of input events received on channel `. If known, the number of
input events on channel ` is incremented using the helper function incin(C;`).
Command output e to ` outputs expression e to channel `. Using helper function recordOutput(E;C;`;f), rule T-OUT
records that the jth output on channel ` is equal to input expression (e), where j is the number of output events produced on
channel `, and increments the number of output events produced on channel ` with helper function incout(C;`). If the number
of output events produced on channel ` is unknown (i.e., j = ?), then no update to E or C is made.
The subsumption rule T-SUB allows the context to be weakened, or made less precise. It uses the ﬂat ordering : for any
lifted set S?, and for any a;b 2 S?, a  b iff a = b or b = ?. We extend the  relation in the obvious way to pairs, and to a
pointwise relation over functions. For example, 0  1 iff for all x 2 Var, 0(x)  1(x). Similarly, we extend the binary
relation v over L to a pointwise relation over functions with codomain L.
The rules for if and while commands (T-IF and T-WHILE respectively) type check their sub-commands with a program
counter level bounded below by pc and  (e), since e controls the execution of the sub-commands. Rule T-WHILE requires that
context is unchanged by the execution of the while command; for any channel `, this means either that the loop body performs
no input or output on `, or that the context cannot precisely track the number on inputs or outputs received on channel `, i.e.,
C(`) = (i;j) and ? 2 fi;jg. Similarly for an if command, the context will lose track of the number on inputs or outputs
received on channel ` unless both branches always perform the same number of inputs and outputs on `.
The type system can easily be converted into an algorithmic type system, using the same technique as Hunt and Sands
[23]. If the security levels L and binary relation v form a join-semi lattice, then type checking and type inference with the
16algorithmic type system is decidable in time polynomial in the size of the program.
If command c is well-typed, then it satisﬁes both weak required release, and delimited release. Theorem 2 below states this
claim formally. To state Theorem 2 concisely, we ﬁrst introduce a helper function and additional notation.
Helper function substOutExp(E;`;g) takes output context E, security level `, and output expression g, and substitutes any
occurrence of out[i] with input expression E(`;i), that is, the input expression that E claims was the ith output on channel `.
For example, if E((L;2)) = inH[1], then substOutExp(E;L;42 + out[2]) = 42 + inH[1]. Rules for substOutExp(E;`;g) are
given in Fig. 4.
We assume there is a notion of equivalence between input expressions, denoted by . We require that if f0  f1, then
for all traces t and v 2 Z?, t in f0 + v iff t in f1 + v. The equivalence relation could be syntactic identity, or syntactic
identity up to commutativity and associativity of operators, or, (depending on the operators in the language) a deeper semantic
equivalence.
Finally, for any set S and v 2 S, we use v as shorthand for a constant function that always returns v. For example, (0;0) is
a function that always returns the pair (0;0).
Theorem 2. If pc; 0;(0;0);?;?;; ` c .  ;C;;E;H for some  0 and pc, then
1. c satisﬁes weak required release of input expression f to user ` using output expression g if substOutExp(E;`;g)  f.
2. c satisﬁes delimited release by escape hatches (f0;`0); :::; (fk;`k) if for all (f;`) 2 H there exists i 2 0::k such that
f  fi and `i v `.
A proof of Theorem 2 appears in Appendix B.
If command c is well-typed, then because it satisﬁes both weak required release, and delimited release, it satisﬁes weak
bounded release.
Corollary 1. Command c satisﬁes weak bounded release by escape chutes (f0;`0;g0); :::; (fk;`k;gk) and escape hatches
(f0
0;`0
0); :::; (f0
n;`0
n) if
pc; 0;(0;0);?;?;; ` c .  ;C;;E;H
for some  0 and pc, and substOutExp(E;`;gi)  fi for all i 2 0::k and for all (f;`) 2 H there exists i 2 0::n such that
f  f0
i and `0
i v `.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 2. u t
Although program P4 satisﬁes bounded release, it does not type-check: it attempts to release information from H to L but
does not have any declassify annotations. Program P6 does type-check. The judgment
L;L;(0;0);?;?;; ` P6 .  ;C;;E;H
holds for
17  = L[cc 7! H;x 7! L;y 7! L]
C = (0;0)[H 7! (1;0);L 7! (0;?)]
 = ?[cc 7! inH[0];x 7! inH[0] mod 10;000;
y 7! inH[0] div 1015]
E = ?[(L;0) 7! “...”;(L;1) 7! inH[0] mod 10;000]
H = f(inH[0] mod 10;000;L);(inH[0] div 1015;L)g:
Thus, by Corollary 1, P6 satisﬁes weak bounded release by escape chute (inH[0]mod10;000;L;out[1]) and escape hatches
(inH[0] mod 10;000;L) and (inH[0] div 1015;L).
We have used a single type system to enforce weak bounded release, which consists of both delimited release and weak
bounded release. It is worth noting which elements of the type system are used to enforce each of the two semantic security
conditions. Enforcement of weak delimited release relies on C (count of input and output events),  (which input expression is
stored in each variable), and E (which input expressions have been output to channels). By contrast, enforcement of delimited
release relies on   (security level of each variable), pc (the program counter level, used to track implicit information ﬂows), H
(which escape hatches have been declassiﬁed), C, and .
There is considerable overlap in the enforcement mechanisms for the two semantic security conditions. The only ele-
ment needed to enforce weak required release that is not needed to enforce delimited release is E, which records which input
expressions have been output to channels.
A more sophisticated static analysis (or a more restrictive language) could enforce strong required release, by reasoning
about the termination of loops, and the eventual production of outputs.
6 Related work
Permitted information release Much recent work has considered information release, but focuses on the speciﬁcation and
enforcementofpermittedinformationrelease. Tothebestofourknowledge, thisworkistheﬁrsttoaddressrequiredinformation
release.
Sabelfeld and Sands [40] present a survey of work on (permitted) information release, and introduce four dimensions
of declassiﬁcation that provide a categorization of semantic security conditions for information release: what information is
released, who releases the information, when does the release happen, and where in the program (and where in the ordering of
security levels) does the release occur.
These dimensions are also relevant to required information release. This work is primarily concerned with what information
is required for release, expressed using input expressions. Strong required release relates to the when aspect: it mandates that
information is eventually released, whereas weak required release places no requirements on when (if ever) information is
released. Further connections between various dimensions of information release and required information release are waiting
18to be explored. For example, required information release could be strengthened by placing stronger requirements on when
a system must release information. Previous work on specifying the conditions under which information is permitted to be
released (e.g., [12, 6]) may also be applicable to specifying when information is required to be released.
The most closely related work on permitted information release is the work on delimited release [39], which was presented
in Section 4 and forms a key component of bounded release security condition. Delimited release was extended to localized
delimited release [3] by restricting not only what information may be released, but where it may be released (at an appropriate
declassify command). The type system used by Sabelfeld and Myers [39] to enforce delimited release also enforces localized
delimited release, so we speculate that the type system used in this paper to enforce bounded release would also enforce an
appropriately deﬁned localized bounded release, where the delimited release component of bounded release is restricted to
localized delimited release.
Lux and Mantel [29] generalize delimited release through the addition of explicit reference points to escape hatches. Escape
hatches, as originally presented by Sabelfeld and Myers [39], allow the declassiﬁcation of escape hatch’s valuation only at the
initial memory. Lux and Mantel allow declassiﬁcation of valuations at arbitrary but explicit program points. This increases the
expressiveness of escape hatches. In an interactive setting, it would permit, for example, the controlled release of an input that
occurs in the body of a loop. Similarly, the expressiveness of escape chutes could be increased, permitting the expression of
required release of inputs that occur in loop bodies.
Broberg and Sands present ﬂow locks [7, 8, 9], a foundational mechanism for describing and controlling information ﬂow.
A ﬂow lock controls information ﬂow between security levels, potentially at ﬁne granularity. A program may explicitly open
or close a ﬂow lock, enabling or disabling information ﬂow. Flow locks are intended to form a core calculus of information
ﬂow, and many information ﬂow semantic security conditions and enforcement mechanisms can be encoded using ﬂow locks.
However, ﬂow locks are concerned with permitted information ﬂow, and it is unclear what modiﬁcations to ﬂow locks would
be required to reason about required information ﬂow.
Swamy and Hicks [42] specify information release policies as security automata [41], and enforce that programs adhere
to the policies using a sophisticated type system. The release policies focus on specifying appropriate obligations that must
be satisﬁed before information is released. We believe that with relatively minor extensions, the information release policies
could be extended to specify when information must be released. Indeed, weak required release is a safety condition, and is
enforceable by edit automata [27], which are a more general class of security automata than the information release polices of
Swamy and Hicks.
Sabelfeld and Sands [40] also introduce several prudent principles of declassiﬁcation. Semantic consistency requires that
the security of a program depends only on extensional properties of the program, not intensional properties. This principle is
directly applicable to required release, and is satisﬁed by weak and strong required release, and bounded release: semantically
equivalent programs satisfy the same security conditions. The other principles (conservativity, monotonicity of release, non-
occlusion, and trailing attacks) are not directly applicable to required release. Lux and Mantel [28] present additional prudent
principles of declassiﬁcation, which are also not directly applicable to required release.
19Knowledge-based semantic security conditions The deﬁnition of required information release was inspired by algorithmic
knowledge [20]. Other semantic security conditions have also recently been deﬁned in terms of attacker knowledge. Askarov
and Sabelfeld [2] use knowledge to deﬁne gradual release: an attacker’s knowledge of secrets may become more precise only at
speciﬁed declassiﬁcation events. Gradual release restricts permitted information release, and as such it sufﬁces to use implicit
knowledge; since we are concerned with required release, we use algorithmic knowledge to ensure that knowledge can be
obtained with reasonable resources. The use of algorithmic knowledge leads us to specify how an observer learns released
information, in addition to what information they learn.
O’Neill [32] presents many information ﬂow conditions in an epistemic framework, but doesn’t consider algorithmic knowl-
edge or required information release.
Enforcement techniques Since weak required release is a safety property, it could be enforced using dynamic techniques,
such as execution monitors [41]. Section 5 demonstrated that a security-type system for delimited release could be easily
extended to enforce weak bounded release, and we anticipate that information-ﬂow monitors (e.g., [25, 4]) could similarly be
extended to enforce weak required release.
Askarov and Sabelfeld [4] present semantic security conditions that generalize localized delimited release and gradual
release, and enforce these conditions a combination of static and dynamic techniques in an interactive language. Their semantic
security condition in essence indexes inputs and outputs from the most recent event. By contrast, the version of delimited
release (and required release) presented here indexes input and output absolutely, from the beginning of program execution.
The languages for input and output expressions could be adapted to use most-recent indexing. This would enable a more
permissive type system: currently, when an input or output occurs in the body of a loop, the type system is unable to count
accurately, and precision is lost. Most-recent indexing would allow the type system to regain precision after a loop body in
which input or output occurs.
Obligations An obligation is a requirement on a system’s or subject’s future behavior. Obligations often arise when a subject
is granted access to data, for example, if a subject is allowed to check data out of a repository, she is obliged to eventually check
the data back in, possibly within some ﬁxed time constraint. Previous work has studied both the speciﬁcation (e.g., [34]) and
analysis (e.g., [11, 21, 18, 16]) of obligations. Although obligations have been considered with respect to privacy (e.g., [30]),
we believe this is the ﬁrst work to consider obligatory information ﬂow.
Required release can be viewed as an obligation on the system to release information in an appropriate form. Weak required
release is a form of integrity: if appropriate output is produced, it must correctly represent the information to be released.
Strong required release is an obligation that must eventually be satisﬁed: the system must always be able to eventually produce
sufﬁcient output. In many practical settings, it may be desirable to strengthen required release, and bound the time until
sufﬁcient output is produced. There are many possible ways of expressing time bounds, including elapsed wall-clock or system
time from the beginning of execution, or from some event (e.g., arrival of sufﬁcient input), or requiring the obligation is satisﬁed
before some other event occurs. Instead of considering these stronger notions of required release, we have focused here on the
20interaction between required and permitted information release. We expect that strengthening required release with time bounds
will not change the relationship between required and permitted release, as, for example, expressed in Property 1.
Irwin et al. [24] deﬁne accountability for violation of an obligation. As currently expressed, it is the system that is re-
sponsible for required release of information (and, as such, Irwin et al. do not regard it as an obligation, which are, by their
deﬁnition, unenforceable by the system). If the who dimension of information release [40] were incorporated into required
release, it may become the responsibility of some security principal to ensure the release of information, ﬁtting into the model
of accountability.
7 Conclusion
As part of their correct functionality, many systems are required (not just permitted) to release information. This paper in-
troduces the problem of required information release: specifying, reasoning about, and enforcing, the information security of
systems that must release information.
We have deﬁned semantic conditions for required information release. Inspired by work on algorithmic knowledge, the
semantic conditions must specify both what information is to be released, and how that information is to be learned by an
observer. Input expressions specify what information is to be released, and output expressions specify how an observer learns
the information. A program satisﬁes weak required release of input expression f to user ` using output expression g if whenever
user ` is able to evaluate g, then f evaluates to the same value. A program satisﬁes strong required release if it satisﬁes weak
required release, and eventually produces sufﬁcient output for user ` to evaluate g.
We investigated the relationship between a system’s required and permitted information release, and deﬁned bounded re-
lease, which combines required release with delimited release. Bounded release speciﬁes upper and lower bounds on the
information a system releases. For many systems, these bounds should be tight: the system should release all and only in-
formation it is required to release. We have shown that (weak) bounded release can be conservatively enforced by a type
system.
Both weak and strong required release are properties: predicates over single execution traces. Noninterference, delimited
release, and many other information security requirements, are hyperproperties, but not properties. One may thus be concerned
whetherrequiredinformationreleaseisaninformationsecurityrequirement. Webelievethatrequiredinformationrelease, while
a property, is clearly concerned with the ﬂow of information in a system: it requires that, at a minimum, certain information
ﬂows to an observer. We have shown a connection between required information release and delimited release: whereas
required information release speciﬁes the minimum information ﬂow from high security inputs to low security outputs that a
system must satisfy, delimited release speciﬁes maximum information ﬂow. Thus, we believe that required information release
is part of a system’s information security requirements.
There is still much left to understand with respect to required information release. There are systems with information
release requirements that cannot be expressed using the policies presented in this paper. For example, ﬁnancial reports of a
company should be released to all shareholders, not a subset; if Alice and Bob are the shareholders, the system must release
21reports to Alice if and only if it releases that information to Bob. In terms of enforcing required information release, it may
be impractical to explicitly specify the knowledge algorithm by which an observer may learn the released information; static
analyses may allow the automatic discovery of the knowledge algorithm, thus reducing the burden of proving a system satisﬁes
required information release.
To build trustworthy computer systems, it is important to understand and provably enforce a system’s information security
requirements. By introducing the concept of required information release, and providing mechanisms to specify and enforce
these requirements, this work brings us closer to the goal of strong, end-to-end, application-speciﬁc information security.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
In this appendix we prove Theorem 1.
We ﬁrst prove a lemma that states that if a program satisﬁes strong required release of input expression f using output
expression g and the program has produced enough output for g to evaluate to a value, then the trace must also have read
enough input for f to evaluate to a value.
Lemma 1. Let command c satisfy strong required release of input expression f to user ` using output expression g. Let f
depend nontrivially on every subexpression of the form in`[i]. Let m = (c;;hi;!) and for some trace t such that m   t, we
have t `
out g + v such that v 6= ?. Then t in f + v.
Proof. Suppose that t `
out g + v such that v 6= ?, but t in f + v0 for v0 6= v. If v0 6= ?, then the command cannot satisfy
strong required release. So it must be the case that v0 = ?. Since by assumptions all binary operators are total and strict, it
must be because the trace has not received sufﬁcient input to evaluate some input expression in`[i]. By strong required release,
we can extend t to a trace t0 such that t0 in f + v.
But we can construct a new joint strategy !0 that is identical to ! except that the user strategy for channel ` returns a
different value for the ith input than would be returned by !. Consider m0 = (c;;hi;!0). Clearly m0   t, since !0 behaves
identically to ! except for the ith input on channel ` which has not yet occurred. By strong required release, we can extend to
a trace t00 such that t00 in f + v. But this violates the assumption that f depends nontrivially in`[i]. u t
25To prove Theorem 1, let c satisfy strong required release of input expression f to user ` using output expression g, and for
conﬁguration m = (c;;hi;!) assume that m   t and t `
out g + v such that v 6= ?. We need to show t in f + v. This
follows immediately from Lemma 1.
B Proof of Theorem 2
In this appendix we prove Theorem 2. Section B.1 shows that a well-typed program satisﬁes required release, and Section B.2
shows that a well-typed program satisﬁes delimited release. We ﬁrst introduce and prove some useful lemmas and theorems
about the type system.
We say that a conﬁguration (c;;t;!) satisﬁes context C;;E if the context C;;E accurately reﬂects the conﬁguration.
That is, the entity C records how many input and output events have been received and sent on each channel, and must agree
with trace t. Similarly,  records input expressions that are equivalent to values stored in the state, and the state  and trace t
must agree on these values. Finally, E records input expressions that are equivalent to output values, and t must satisfy these
relationships.
Deﬁnition 6. We say that conﬁguration (c;;t;!) satisﬁes context C;;E, written C;;E; (c;;t;!) if all of the following
conditions hold.
1. For all ` 2 L, let C(`) = (i;j).
(a) Either i = ? or jt(Evin \ Ev(`))j = i; and
(b) Either j = ? or jt(Evout \ Ev(`))j = j.
2. For all x 2 Var, either (x) = ? or t in (x) + (x).
3. For all ` 2 L and i 2 N, either E(`;i) = ? or t in E(`;i) + v where (t(Ev(`) \ Evout))(i) = out(`;v).
The operational semantics preserve typings.
Lemma 2 (Type preservation). If
C;;E; (c;;t;!)
and
pc; ;C;;E;H ` c .  0;C0;0;E0;H0
and
(c;;t;!)  ! (c0;0;t0;!);
then there exists C00, 00, E00, H00,  00 and pc00 such that
pc00; 00;C00;00;E00;H00 ` c0 .  0;C0;0;E0;H0
26and
C00;00;E00; (c0;0;t0;!):
Proof. By induction on the typing judgment pc; ;C;;E;H ` c .  0;C0;0;E0;H0. u t
The type system ensures that the count of input and output events on each channel can only increase, or lose precision.
Lemma 3. Given pc; ;C;;E;H ` c .  0;C0;0;E0;H0 and ` 2 L, let C(`) = (i;j) and C0(`) = (i0;j0). Either i 6= ?
and i0 6= ? and i  i0 or i0 = ?. Also, either j 6= ? and j0 6= ? and j  j0 or j0 = ?.
Proof. Proof by induction on pc; ;C;;E;H ` c .  0;C0;0;E0;H0. u t
Similarly, the type system ensures that for typing context E (which records input expressions that are equivalent to output
values), the post-context may be less precise than the pre-context, but otherwise agrees with it. That is, once the type system
has recorded that a given input expression is equivalent to a given output value, the type system can not change it to a different
input expression.
Lemma 4. Given pc; ;C;;E;H ` c .  0;C0;0;E0;H0 and ` 2 L, let C(`) = (i;j). If j = ? then for all k 2 N, we
have E(`;k)  E0(`;k). If j 2 N then for all 0  k < j, we have E(`;k)  E0(`;k).
Proof. By induction on the typing judgment pc; ;C;;E;H ` c .  0;C0;0;E0;H0, using Lemma 3 for the case for
sequence. u t
ThesubstitutionfunctionsubstOutExp(E;`;g)iscorrect, inthatifoutputexpressiong evaluatestoavaluev, thenreplacing
all out[i] subexpressions with appropriate input expressions stored in E will result in an input expression that also evaluates to
v.
Lemma 5. If C;;E; (c;;t;!) and t `
out g + v and E(`;i) 6= ? for all i such that out[i] appears in g (that may affect
the evaluation of g), then t in substOutExp(E;`;g) + v
Proof. By induction on substOutExp(E;`;g). The only interesting case is g = out[i] (where out[i] may affect the evaluation of
the whole output expression). In that case, substOutExp(E;`;g) = E(`;i) 6= ?. We have (t(Evout \Ev(`)))[i] = out(`;v),
and so, since C;;E; (c;;t;!), we have t in E(`;i) + v. u t
B.1 Required release
Having shown several useful lemmas, we are now ready to prove that well-typed programs satisfy required release.
Lemma 6. If
pc; 0;(0;0);?;?;; ` c .  ;C;;E;H
for some  0 and pc, and substOutExp(E;`;g)  f, then c satisﬁes weak required release of input expression f to user ` using
output expression g.
27Proof. Assume pc; 0;(0;0);?;?;; ` c .  ;C;;E;H for some  0 and pc, and substOutExp(E;`;g)  f. Let m =
(c;;hi;!) for some  and !. Suppose that m  ! (c0;0;t;!) and t `
out g + v for some v 6= ?. We need to show that
t in f + v.
By repeated application of Lemma 2, there exists C0, 0, E0, H0,  0 and pc0 such that pc0; 0;C0;0;E0;H0 ` c0 .
 ;C;;E;H and C0;0;E0; (c0;0;t;!). Since t `
out g + v for v 6= ?, there have been sufﬁcient output events to channel
` to evaluate g to a non-? value. Since C0;0;E0; (c0;0;t;!), we have C0(`) = (i;j) and either j = ? or j = jt(Evout \
Ev(`))j. Either way, by Lemma 4, we have substOutExp(E0;`;g) = substOutExp(E;`;g). Since substOutExp(E0;`;g) 
f, then E0(`;i) 6= ? for all i such that out(`;i) appears in g (that may affect the evaluation of g). By Lemma 5, t in
substOutExp(E0;`;g) + v. From the deﬁnition of , we have t in f + v as required. u t
B.2 Delimited release
We prove that the type system enforces delimited release user a proof technique based on the technique of Pottier and Simonet
[35] for showing noninterference in the ML programming language. We deﬁne a new language, IMPI2, that can represent two
executions of a program. We show that type preservation in IMPI2 implies that the program satisﬁes delimited release. (For
convenience, we use IMPI to refer to the interactive imperative language presented in Section 3.)
B.2.1 Syntax and semantics
The language IMPI2 extends the interactive language with pair constructs for commands Lc1 jc2 M, integers Lv1 jv2 M, and events
L1 j2 M. The pair constructs represent different commands, integers, and events that may arise in two different executions
of a program. A command pair cannot be nested inside another command pair, but can otherwise appear nested at arbitrary
depth. Integer pairs are used to represent different input values that may be provided by different user strategies, and to track
how states differ in different executions of a program: user strategies in IMPI2 are functions from (IMPI) traces to integers and
integer pairs, and stores in IMPI2 are functions from variables to integers and integer pairs. We introduce the special event void,
and allow elements of event pairs to range over events and void. The constant void is used to indicate that an event occurred in
only one of the two executions. We also allow input and output values to range over integer pairs and integers.
(expressions) e ::= ::: j Lv1 jv2 M
(commands) c ::= ::: j Lc1 jc2 M
For an extended command c, let the projections bcc1 and bcc2 represent the two commands that c encodes. The projection
functions satisfy bLc1 jc2 Mci = ci, and are homomorphisms on other commands. Similarly for integer pairs, bLv1 jv2 Mci = vi.
The projection functions are extended to states, so that
bci(x) =
8
> > <
> > :
v if (x) = n
vi if (x) = Lv1 jv2 M
28The evaluation of expressions are also extended, so that binary operations  are homomorphic on integer pairs. Thus, (e), the
evaluation of expression e using state , may be either an integer n or an integer pair Lv1 jv2 M.
We extend projection to event pairs (bL1 j2 Mci = i) and deﬁne projection homomorphically on events. We deﬁne
projection on traces inductively, as follows.
bhici = hi
bh0;1;:::ici =
8
> > <
> > :
bh1;:::ici if b0ci = void
hb0ciiˆbh1;:::ici otherwise
Finally, we extend projection to joint strategies, so that for any ` and t, b!ci(`)(t) = b!(`)(t)ci.
We indicate IMPI2 conﬁgurations with a bullet () subscript: (c;;t;!). A IMPI2 conﬁguration represents a pair of IMPI
conﬁgurations.
The complete operational semantics of IMPI2 are given in Fig. 5. Note that rules OS2-ASSIGN, OS2-SEQ-1, OS2-SEQ-
2, OS2-IN, OS2-OUT, OS2-IF-1, OS2-IF-2, OS2-DECLASSIFY, and OS2-WHILE are similar to their counterparts in the
language IMPI. Rules OS2-IF-1 and OS2-DECLASSIFY have been modiﬁed to be restricted to apply only to integer results of
evaluating expression e.
The rule OS2-PAIR-LIFT evaluates one of the two subcommands of a pair command Lc1 jc2 M. The memory and trace are
update to indicate that only one of the two executions represented by the conﬁguration made progress. Thus, bcj = b0cj and
btcj = bt0cj, where j 2 f1;2g is the execution that did not make progress. Note that the small step relation used in the premise
is small step relation of language IMPI.
The rule OS2-PAIR-SKIP applies when the two commands represented by a command pair have both ﬁnished executing.
This rule removes the command pair.
The rule OS2-PAIR-IF applies when the evaluation of a conditional expression differs in the two executions represented by
the IMPI2 conﬁguration. This rule introduces a command pair, representing the different branches that may be taken by the two
executions. This is the only rule that introduces command pairs.
The rule OS2-PAIR-DECLASSIFY applies when an expression is declassiﬁed in both executions represented by the execu-
tion, and the evaluation of the expression is the same in both executions.
B.2.2 Adequacy
The language IMPI2 is adequate to express the execution of two IMPI programs. We show that the execution of a IMPI2 program
is sound (a step taken by a IMPI2 program corresponds to one or zero steps taken by its projections) and complete (given two
IMPI executions, there is a IMPI2 execution whose projection agrees with at least one of them). We write  != for the reﬂexive
closure of  !.
Lemma 7 (Soundness). If (c;;t;!)  ! (c0;0;t0;!), then (bcci;bci;btci;b!ci)  != (bc0ci;b0ci;bt0ci;b!ci) for
29i 2 f1;2g.
Proof. By induction on the derivation (c;;t;!)  ! (c0;0;t0;!). The interesting cases are the new rules introduced for
IMPI2: OS2-PAIR-LIFT, OS2-PAIR-SKIP, OS2-PAIR-IF, and OS2-PAIR-DECLASSIFY. For a reduction using OS2-PAIR-
LIFT, clearly one of the two projections takes a step, while the other projection remains unchanged. For OS2-PAIR-SKIP, both
projections remain unchanged. For both OS2-PAIR-IF, and OS2-PAIR-DECLASSIFY, both projections take a step. u t
If an IMPI2 conﬁguration is stuck, it is because one of the two projections is stuck.
Lemma 8 (Stuck conﬁgurations). If (c;;t;!) is stuck (i.e., cannot be reduced and c 6= skip), then (bcci;bci;btci;b!ci) is
stuck for some i 2 f1;2g.
Proof. By structural induction on command c. u t
Given two IMPI evaluations, there is an IMPI2 evaluation that represents the same IMPI evaluation for at least one of the
two evaluation.
Lemma 9 (Completeness). If (bcci;bci;btci;b!ci)  ! (c0
i;0
i;t0
i;b!ci) for i 2 f1;2g, then there exists a IMPI2 con-
ﬁguration (c0;0;t0;!) such that (c;;t;!)  ! (c0;0;t0;!) and (bc0ci;b0ci;bt0ci;b!ci) = (c0
i;0
i;t0
i;b!ci) for some
i 2 f1;2g.
Proof. Leti = (bcci;bci;btci;b!ci):::(c0
i;0
i;t0
i;b!ci)bethesequenceofconﬁgurationsthatwitnesses(bcci;bci;btci;b!ci)  !
(c0
i;0
i;t0
i;b!ci).
Letni bethelengthofi. Forasequence IMPI2 conﬁgurations = (c;;t;!) :::(c0;0;t0;!) thatwitnesses(c;;t;!)  !
(c0;0;t0;!), let fi() be ni minus the number of reduction steps in  that reduce the ith projection. Note that fi() is non-
negative. Consider g() = min(f1();f2()). If g() = 0, then  is a sequence that satisﬁes the conditions.
Suppose g() > 0. Consider the function
h() = (g(); jf1()   f2()j; numPairs([jj   1]))
where [jj   1] refers to the last conﬁguration in the sequence , and numPairs((c;;t;!)) returns the number of pair
commands in c. Note that all elements of the triple returned by h() are non-negative. If we can extend  by one step to a
sequence 0 such that h(0) < h() under lexicographic ordering, then, by repeated applications, eventually we will produce a
sequence 00 such that g(00) = 0.
We now show how to extend sequence  to a sequence 0 such that h(0) < h(). By assumption, g() > 0, so neither last
conﬁguration of 1 or 2 is stuck. By Lemma 8, we can extend  by one more step, producing trace 0. By Lemma 7, either
fi(0) = fi() 1 for some i 2 f1;2g, or fi(0) = fi() for all i 2 f1;2g. If the former, then h(0) < h(). If the latter, then
the rule OS2-PAIR-SKIP was used in the reduction, and the last conﬁguration of 0 has one fewer pair commands than the last
conﬁguration of , and so h(0) < h(). u t
30B.2.3 Type preservation
We extend the type system to IMPI2 commands and conﬁgurations. Typing judgments are now of the form
pc; ;C;;E;H `` c .  0;C0;0;E0;H0
where ` 2 L. Intuitively, if IMPI2 command c is well-typed with typing parameter `, then c represents the two IMPI commands
that are indistinguishable from the point of view of any user `0 such that `0 v `.
Because our type system is ﬂow-dependent, we need to extend the typing context entities  , , and E so that they range
over pairs. This allows the expression of different typing contexts for the two IMPI commands represented by a single IMPI2
command. Thus,   ranges over security levels L and pairs of security levels (written L`1 j`2 M. Similarly,  and E range over
elements of InputExp? and pairs of elements of InputExp?. We also extend the entity C so that its range is (Z? [ (Z? 
Z?))  (Z? [ (Z?  Z?)). That is, for any ` 2 L, we have C(`)(i;j), where i is either an integer (indicating the number
of inputs received on channel `), ? (indicating an unknown number of inputs received on channel `), or a pair (i1;i2), where
i1 indicates inputs received on channel ` in the ﬁrst execution, and i2 indicates inputs received on channel ` in the second
execution. Similarly, j describes the outputs sent on channel ` in both executions. We deﬁne projection operations bc1 and
bc2 for all the extended entities. We extend relations v and  such that
` v L`1 j`2 M () ` v `1 and ` v `2
L`1 j`2 M v ` () `1 v ` and `2 v `
L`1 j`2 M v L`0
1 j`0
2 M () `1 v `0
1 and `2 v `0
2
v  Lv1 jv2 M () v  v1 and v  v2
Lv1 jv2 M  v () v1  v and v2  v
Lv1 jv2 M  Lv0
1 jv0
2 M () v1  v0
1 and v2  v0
2
Typing rules for IMPI (given in Fig. 3) are made into typing rules for IMPI2 by adding the typing parameter ` to every rule.
In addition, we severely restrict when the typing context entities may differ for the two different IMPI commands represented
by a single IMPI2 command. We require for judgment pc; ;C;;E;H `` c .  0;C0;0;E0;H0 that (a) the images of C0,
0, E0 and  0 do not contain any pairs (i.e., they are suitable IMPI entities); and (b) if c does not contain a command pair, then
C, , E and   do not contain any pairs. We use the predicate noPairs( ;C;;E) to indicate that the images of C, , E and
  do not contain any pairs.
All typing rules for IMPI2 are presented in Fig. 6. The typing rule for the new pair command, T2-PAIR, requires that
both projections type check using IMPI typing rules, for a program counter level pc0 that is at least as restrictive as typing
parameter `. Intuitively, this will ensure that any side-effects of a command pair will not be observable at level ` or below.
Note that the premise of T2-PAIR uses the typing judgment for IMPI, i.e., without the typing parameter `. This is because
31well-formed commands do not have nested command pairs. All typing rules other than T2-PAIR correspond closely to their
IMPI counterpart.
We deﬁne a notion of satisfaction for IMPI2 conﬁgurations. Intuitively, an IMPI2 conﬁguration satisﬁes context C;;E; 
for ` if the two IMPI conﬁgurations represented by the IMPI2 conﬁguration are identical at all levels `0 such that `0 v `, and each
IMPI conﬁguration satisﬁes the appropriate IMPI context. We also require that no command pair appears as a subcommand of
an if or while command.
Deﬁnition 7. We say that conﬁguration (c;;t;!) satisﬁes context C;;E;  for `, written  ;C;;E ` (c;;t;!) if all
of the following conditions hold.
1. For all x 2 Var, if (x) is a pair value then  (x) 6v `.
2. For all i such that 0  i < jtj, if value(t(i)) is a pair value, then level(t(i)) 6v `, where
value(L1 j2 M) = L0j0M
value(in(`;v)) = v
value(out(`;v)) = v
level(LvoidjM) = level()
level(LjvoidM) = level()
level(in(`;v)) = `
level(out(`;v)) = `
3. For all `0;t0, if !(`0)(t0) is a pair value, then `0 6v `.
4. bCci;bci;bEci; (bcci;bci;btci;b!ci) for i 2 f1;2g.
5. No command pair appears as a subcommand of an if or while command of c.
The execution of a IMPI2 program preserves typings. The following type-preservation theorem is key to showing that
well-typed IMPI programs satisfy delimited release.
Theorem 3 (Type preservation). Let c be an IMPI2 command such that
pc; ;C;;E;H `` c .  0;C0;0;E0;H0;
and let (c;;t;!) be an IMPI2 conﬁguration such that
 ;C;;E ` (c;;t;!)
32If
(c;;t;!)  ! (c0;0;t0;!)
and bt0c1 and bt0c2 agree up to ` on escape hatches H0 then there exists C00, 00, E00, H00,  00, and pc00 such that
pc00; 00;C00;00;E00;H00 `` c0 .  0;C0;0;E0;H0
and
 00;C00;00;E00 ` (c0;0;t0;!):
Proof. By induction on the typing judgment pc; ;C;;E;H `` c .  0;C0;0;E0;H0.
u t
Before proving that the IMPI type system enforces delimited release, we ﬁrst prove some useful lemmas about the IMPI2
type system.
The judgment  0;C0;0;E0 ` (c0;0;t;!) ensures that the two traces represented by IMPI2 trace t are identical to user
`. More precisely, all input and output on any channel bounded above by typing parameter ` is the same in both executions.
Lemma 10. If  0;C0;0;E0 ` (c0;0;t;!) then btc1`0 = btc2`0 for any `0 2 L such that `0 v `.
Proof. By induction on the length of t. The base case, t = hi, is trivial. Consider ˆt, and assume that btc1  `0 = btc2  `0.
If level() 6= `0, then bˆtci  `0 = btci  `0 for i 2 f1;2g, and the result holds. If level() v `0 then by  0;C0;0;E0 `
(c0;0;t;!) we have value() is not a pair value. Thus, bc1 = bc2, and bˆtc1`0 = bˆtc2`0 as required. u t
If an IMPI command is well-typed in the IMPI type system, then it is well-typed in the IMPI2 type system.
Lemma 11. If c is an IMPI command (i.e., does not contain any command pairs), and
pc; ;C;;E;H ` c .  0;C0;0;E0;H0
then for all ` we have
pc; ;C;;E;H `` c .  0;C0;0;E0;H0:
Proof. Every IMPI typing rule is made into an IMPI2 typing rule by adding the typing parameter `. u t
B.2.4 Proof of delimited release
Using the type preservation of IMPI2, and the lemmas above, we can now show that a well-typed IMPI program satisﬁes
delimited release.
Lemma 12. If
pc; 0;(0;0);?;?;; ` c .  ;C;;E;H
33for some  0 and pc, and for all (f;`) 2 H there exists i 2 0::k such that f  fi and `i v `, then c satisﬁes delimited release
by escape hatches (f0;`0);:::;(fk;`k).
Proof. Assume pc; 0;(0;0);?;?;; ` c .  ;C;;E;H for some  0 and pc. Let escape hatches (f0;`0);:::;(fk;`k) be
ﬁxed, and assume that for all (f;`) 2 H there exists i 2 0::k such that f  fi and `i v `.
Let ` 2 L. Let !1 and !2 be joint strategies such that !1(`0) = !2(`0) for all `0 v `. Let  be an initial state, and t1 and t2 be
traces such that t1 and t2 agree up to ` on escape hatches (f0;`0);:::;(fk;`k), and (c;;hi;!1)   t1 and (c;;hi;!2)   t2.
By Lemma 11, pc; 0;(0;0);?;?;; `` c .  ;C;;E;H. Since for all (f;`0) 2 H there exists i 2 0::k such that f  fi
and `i v `0, and so traces t1 and t2 agree up to ` on escape hatches H.
Let  be a state that contains no pair values. Let ! be a IMPI2 joint strategy such that b!ci = !i, and for any `0 and t0, if
`0 v ` then !(`0)(t0) is not a pair value. Note that ?; 0;(0;0);? ` (c;;hi;!).
Suppose that both t1 and t2 are ﬁnite traces. Then by Lemma 9 and Lemma 7, there is an IMPI2 conﬁguration (c0;0;t;!)
such that (c;;hi;!)  ! (c0;0;t;!) and btci = ti and tj  btcj for some i and j such that fi;jg = f1;2g. By repeated
applications of Theorem 3, we have  0;C0;0;E0 ` (c0;0;t;!) for some C0, 0, E0, and  0. Thus, by Lemma 10, we have
btci` = btcj `, and so tj `  ti` and thus t1 ` t2 as required.
Let one or both of t1 or t2 be an inﬁnite trace. Suppose that it is not the case that either t1  `  t2  ` or t2  `  t1  `.
Therefore there is some index n such that (t1  `)(n) 6= (t2  `)(n). Consider ﬁnite traces t0
1 and t0
2 such that t1  t0
1 and
t2  t0
2, and jt0
1  `j = jt0
2  `j = n + 1. Note that (c;;hi;!1)   t0
1 and (c;;hi;!2)   t0
2. By a similar argument above,
we derive that t0
1 ` t0
2. But this implies that (t0
1  `)(n) = (t0
2  `)(n), a contradiction! Therefore, either t1  `  t2  ` or
t2`  t1`, and so t1 ` t2 as required. u t
B.3 Bounded release
The proof of Theorem 2 follows immediately from Lemmas 6 and 12.
34OS-ASSIGN
(x := e;;t;!)  ! (skip;[x 7! (e)];t;!)
OS-SEQ-1
(skip;c;;t;!)  ! (c;;t;!)
OS-SEQ-2
(c0;;t;!)  ! (c0
0;0;t0;!)
(c0;c1;;t;!)  ! (c0
0;c1;0;t0;!)
OS-IN
!(`)(t`) = v
(input x from `;;t;!)  ! (skip;[x 7! v];tˆhin(`;v)i;!)
OS-OUT
(e) = v
(output e to `;;t;!)  ! (skip;;tˆhout(`;v)i;!)
OS-IF-1
(e) 6= 0
(if e then c0 else c1;;t;!)  ! (c0;;t;!)
OS-IF-2
(e) = 0
(if e then c0 else c1;;t;!)  ! (c1;;t;!)
OS-WHILE
(while e do c;;t;!)  ! (if e then (c;while e do c) else skip;;t;!)
OS-DECLASSIFY
(x := declassify(e to `);;t;!)  ! (skip;[x 7! (e)];t;!)
Figure 1: Operational semantics
35t in n + n
t in f0 + v0
t in f1 + v1
t in f0  f1 + v
v = v0  v1
t0 = t(Ev(`) \ Evin)
t0(i) = in(`;v)
t in in`[i] + v
t0 = t(Ev(`) \ Evin)
:(0  i < jt0j)
t in in`[i] + ?
t `
out n + n
t `
out g0 + v0
t `
out g1 + v1
t `
out g0  g1 + v
v = v0  v1
t0 = t(Ev(`) \ Evout)
t0(i) = out(`;v)
t `
out out[i] + v
t0 = t(Ev(`) \ Evout)
:(0  i < jt0j)
t `
out out[i] + ?
Figure 2: Evaluation rules for input and output expressions
36T-ASSIGN
pc v `  (e) v `
 0 =  [x 7! `] 0 = [x 7! (e)]
pc; ;C;;E;H ` x := e .  0;C;0;E;H
T-SEQ
pc; ;C;;E;H ` c0 .  0;C0;0;E0;H0
pc; 0;C0;0;E0;H0 ` c1 .  00;C00;00;E00;H00
pc; ;C;;E;H ` c0;c1 .  00;C00;00;E00;H00
T-IN
pc v `  0 =  [x 7! `]
C0 = incin(C;`) 0 = recordInput(;x;C;`)
pc; ;C;;E;H ` input x from ` .  0;C0;0;E;H
T-OUT
pc v `  (e) v ` C0 = incout(C;`)
E0 = recordOutput(E;C;`;(e))
pc; ;C;;E;H ` output e to ` .  ;C0;;E0;H
T-IF
pc v pc0  (e) v pc0 i = 0;1
pc0; ;C;;E;H ` ci .  0;C0;0;E0;H0
pc; ;C;;E;H ` if e then c0 else c1 .  0;C0;0;E0;H0
T-WHILE
pc v pc0  (e) v pc0
pc0; ;C;;E;H ` c .  ;C;;E;H
pc; ;C;;E;H ` while e do c .  ;C;;E;H
T-DECLASSIFY
pc v `0 ` v `0  0 =  [x 7! `0]
0 = [x 7! (e)] H0 = H [ f((e);`)g
pc; ;C;;E;H ` x := declassify(e to `) .  0;C;0;E;H0
T-SKIP
pc; ;C;;E;H ` skip .  ;C;;E;H
T-SUB
 0 v  1  0
1 v  0
0 pc0 v pc1
C0  C1 C0
1  C0
0 0  1 0
1  0
0
E0  E1 E0
1  E0
0 H0  H1 H0
1  H0
0
pc1; 1;C1;1;E1;H1 ` c .  0
1;C0
1;0
1;E0
1;H0
1
pc0; 0;C0;0;E0;H0 ` c .  0
0;C0
0;0
0;E0
0;H0
0
recordInput(;x;C;`) =
(
[x 7! ?] if C(`) = (?;j)
[x 7! in`[i]] if C(`) = (i;j);i 6= ?
recordOutput(E;C;`;f) =
(
E if C(`) = (i;?)
E[(`;j) 7! f] if C(`) = (i;j);j 6= ?
incin(C;`) =
(
C if C(`) = (?;j)
C[` 7! (i + 1;j)] if C(`) = (i;j);i 6= ?
incout(C;`) =
(
C if C(`) = (i;?)
C[` 7! (i;j + 1)] if C(`) = (i;j);j 6= ?
Figure 3: Typing rules
37substOutExp(E;`;n) = n
substOutExp(E;`;g0  g1) = substOutExp(E;`;g0) 
substOutExp(E;`;g1)
substOutExp(E;`;out[i]) = E(`;i)
Figure 4: substOutExp(E;`;g)
38OS2-ASSIGN
(x := e;;t;!)  ! (skip;[x 7! (e)];t;!)
OS2-SEQ-1
(skip;c;;t;!)  ! (c;;t;!)
OS2-SEQ-2
(c0;;t;!)  ! (c0
0;0;t0;!)
(c0;c1;;t;!)  ! (c0
0;c1;0;t0;!)
OS2-IN
!(`)(t`) = v
(input x from `;;t;!)  ! (skip;[x 7! v];tˆhin(`;v)i;!)
OS2-OUT
(e) = v
(output e to `;;t;!)  ! (skip;;tˆhout(`;v)i;!)
OS2-IF-1
(e) 6= 0 (e) 2 Z
(if e then c0 else c1;;t;!)  ! (c0;;t;!)
OS2-IF-2
(e) = 0
(if e then c0 else c1;;t;!)  ! (c1;;t;!)
OS2-PAIR-SKIP
(LskipjskipM;;t;!)  ! (skip;;t;!)
OS2-DECLASSIFY
(e) 6= Lv jv M
(x := declassify(e to `);;t;!)  ! (skip;[x 7! (e)];t;!)
OS2-WHILE
(while e do c;;t;!)  ! (if e then (c;while e do c) else skip;;t;!)
OS2-PAIR-LIFT
fi;jg = f1;2g (ci;bci;btci;b!ci)  ! (c0
i;0
i;t0
i;b!ci) c0
j = cj
0 = x:
(
L0
1(x)j0
2(x)M if bci(x) 6= 0
i(x)
(x) otherwise
t0 =
(
t if btci = t0
i
tˆhL0 j1 Mi if btci 6= t0
i
i = t0
i(jt0
ij   1) j = void
(Lc1 jc2 M;;t;!)  ! (Lc0
1 jc0
2 M;0;t0;!)
OS2-PAIR-IF
(e) = Lv1 jv2 M c0
i =
(
c0 if vi 6= 0
c1 if vi = 0
(if e then c0 else c1;;t;!)  ! (Lc0
1 jc0
2 M;;t;!)
OS2-PAIR-DECLASSIFY
(e) = Lv jv M
(x := declassify(e to `);;t;!)  ! (skip;[x 7! v];t;!)
Figure 5: Operational semantics of IMPI2
39T2-ASSIGN
pc v `0  (e) v `0 noPairs( ;C;;E)
 0 =  [x 7! `0] 0 = [x 7! (e)]
pc; ;C;;E;H `` x := e .  0;C;0;E;H
T2-SKIP
noPairs( ;C;;E)
pc; ;C;;E;H `` skip .  ;C;;E;H
T2-SEQ
pc; ;C;;E;H `` c0 .  0;C0;0;E0;H0
pc; 0;C0;0;E0;H0 `` c1 .  00;C00;00;E00;H00
noPairs( 0;C0;0;E0) noPairs( 00;C00;00;E00)
if c0 does not contain any command pairs then noPairs( ;C;;E)
pc; ;C;;E;H `` c0;c1 .  00;C00;00;E00;H00
T2-IN
pc v `0  0 =  [x 7! `0]
noPairs( ;C;;E)
C0 = incin(C;`0)
0 = recordInput(;x;C;`0)
pc; ;C;;E;H `` input x from `0 .  0;C0;0;E;H
T2-OUT
pc v `0  (e) v `0
noPairs( ;C;;E)
C0 = incout(C;`0)
E0 = recordOutput(E;C;`0;(e))
pc; ;C;;E;H `` output e to `0 .  ;C0;;E0;H
T2-IF
pc v pc0  (e) v pc0 i = 0;1 noPairs( 0;C0;0;E0)
pc0; ;C;;E;H `` ci .  0;C0;0;E0;H0
if ci does not contain command pairs then noPairs( ;C;;E)
pc; ;C;;E;H `` if e then c0 else c1 .  0;C0;0;E0;H0
T2-WHILE
pc v pc0  (e) v pc0 noPairs( ;C;;E)
pc0; ;C;;E;H `` c .  ;C;;E;H
pc; ;C;;E;H `` while e do c .  ;C;;E;H
T2-DECLASSIFY
pc v `00 `0 v `00  0 =  [x 7! `00] noPairs( ;C;;E)
0 = [x 7! (e)] H0 = H [ f((e);`0)g
pc; ;C;;E;H `` x := declassify(e to `0) .  0;C;0;E;H0
T2-SUB
 0 v  1  0
1 v  0
0 pc0 v pc1 noPairs( 0
0;C0
0;0
0;E0
0)
C0  C1 C0
1  C0
0 0  1 0
1  0
0
E0  E1 E0
1  E0
0 H0  H1 H0
1  H0
0
pc1; 1;C1;1;E1;H1 `` c .  0
1;C0
1;0
1;E0
1;H0
1
if c does not contain any command pairs then noPairs( 0;C0;0;E0)
pc0; 0;C0;0;E0;H0 `` c .  0
0;C0
0;0
0;E0
0;H0
0
T2-PAIR
pc v pc0 pc0 6v ` noPairs( 0;C0;0;E0) i = 1;2
pc0;b ci;bCci;bci;bEci;H ` ci .  0;C0;0;E0;H0
pc; ;C;;E;H `` Lc1 jc2 M .  0;C0;0;E0;H0
Figure 6: Typing rules
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